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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BILLIE R. GILL, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Petitioner/Appellee, 
v. 
Appellate Case No. 20030249-CA 
JOSEPH E. FERRERI, District Court Case No. 034600040 
Respondent/Appellant. Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Respondent/Appellant, Joseph E. Ferreri, (respondent) submits the following as his brief 
in the above matter: 
JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY 
Jurisdiction to review the trial court's judgment and order, which is the domestic violence 
protective order, is vested in the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to the Rules of the Utah Court 
of Appeals, Rules 3 and 4, and Utah Code Annotated. §78-2a-3(2)(h). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from a final judgment and order granting a domestic violence 
protective order. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court have sufficient evidence and make sufficient factual findings 
to support its conclusion that respondent committed abuse and that a substantial likelihood 
existed that abuse would occur again, warranting the entry of a protective order? 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, CASES, STATUTES AND RULES 
The issues are determined pursuant to the Cohabitant Abuse Act, §§30-6-1 to 14 Utah 
Code Ann., (1953 as amended). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review is the clearly erroneous standard. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an order of the Sixth Judicial District Court in and for Sanpete 
County, State of Utah. 
The parties were husband and wife, having married on August 19, 2000. The parties 
separated on or about November 27, 2000. On or about August 5 and 8, 2002, the parties' 
divorce action was tried to the bench. The same judge eventually tried the protective order 
petition at issue in this case. The parties were divorced pursuant to a decree entered January 
22, 2003. During the time period between their separation and the divorce trial, the parties 
developed a history of difficulties in exercising parent-time. In its findings, the court 
characterized as venom on petitioner's part and "frustration" on respondent's part. See 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, paragraph 36, attached as Exhibit "A." The court 
recalled this characterization during the protective order trial. See Tr. 2/19/03, p. 24, II. 4-7. 
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On February 14, 2003, petitioner filed a pro se verified ex-parte petition for a protective 
order. Petitioner claimed that on February 13, 2003, the evening before, respondent had 
assaulted her while dropping off the parties' child after exercising parent-time. Specifically, 
petitioner claimed that respondent reached in through the door when her back was turned and 
slammed her head into a piece of furniture next to the door. Then she claimed respondent left. 
See Verified Petition for Protective Order, attached as Exhibit "B." 
The protective order was tried before the bench on February 19, 2003. The court 
entered a protective order with the sole provision that "the respondent is restrained from 
attempting, committing, or threatening to commit abuse of domestic violence against petitioner." 
Protective Order, paragraph 1, attached as Exhibit "C." 
The court, upon entering the protective order, did not make a specific finding of fact, nor 
did the trial court find that abuse had occurred. Instead, the court simply stated: 
You [petitioner] have an obvious injury. Ah, I have diametrically opposed 
testimony. What I'm asked to do is to decide whether or not to enter a protective 
order. That's a - cautionary device to prevent trouble in the future. I come 
down on that side. I enter a protective order, ah, adjoining restraining the 
respondent from attempting, committing, or threatening to abuse or domestic 
violence against the petitioner. Ah, that's the extent to which I'm entering a 
protective order. 
Tr. 2/19/03, p. 26, II. 13-21 
Because the court entered a protective order without making findings that abuse had 
occurred, respondent moved the court for a new trial on or about March 5, 2003. 
The court issued an order denying respondent's motion for a new trial by stating: 
The Court heard the competing versions [of the incident on February 13, 2003] 
and concluded that petitioner's version was credible and that abuse had 
occurred and that there was a substantial likelihood that abuse would occur 
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again. If the Court failed to articulate that clearly, it was inadvertent and the 
failure is herein remedied. It would serve no useful purpose to rehear the 
competing stories. 
Order Denying Motion for New Trial attached as Exhibit "D." 
Respondent appeals the entry of the protective order on the grounds that the court did 
not have sufficient evidence to enter a protective order and did not make specific findings to 
warrant the entry of a permanent protective order. Rather, the trial court entered a protective 
order as a prophylactic measure, akin to a civil restraining order in a domestic case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were previously husband and wife. Tr.2/19/03, p. 6,1. 12. The marriage 
was dissolved by a decree of divorce entered in the Sixth Judicial District Court, Sanpete 
County, State of Utah, on January 23, 2003. 
On or about February 14, 2003, petitioner/appellee (petitioner) filed a pro se verified ex-
parte petition for a protective order. See Exhibit "B." In her petition, at paragraph 5, petitioner 
alleged that on or about February 13, 2003, respondent threatened, attempted or caused the 
following acts of domestic violence: 
Joe [respondent] came to my home at 8 p.m. to drop Jaycee [the parties' child] 
off. I took Jaycee from him, he was saying he wasn't taking Jaycee back to the 
doctor. He wanted me to take the doctors [sic] card and I wouldn't. I set Jaycee 
down and as I was coming up he grabbed the back of my head and slammed it 
down on my wall tree by the door. He threw the card at me and left. I was 
screaming, all 4 of my kids were screaming. I was cut above my eye and it was 
bleeding. I imediately [sic] called 911. The police then came and took my 
statement and pictures. 
At paragraph 6, petitioner, in response to an opportunity on the petition to describe other 
acts of abuse or domestic violence by respondent, stated: 
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He has beat [sic] my boys. Killed cats beat his first wife. He has had a 
pschiatric [sic] profil [sic] done which states he has violent outbursts. He has 
tried to break in to my home. He has taken pictures through my windows. He 
has been arrested for tresspassing [sic]. He has tried to hire people to beat me 
up. He has tried to hire people to beat my fiance. 
The accusations of abuse listed in paragraph 6 refer to the numerous and 
unsubstantiated allegations of abuse that petitioner has made against respondent in the past. 
None of these accusations have resulted in the entry of previous protective orders, criminal 
convictions, or findings of abuse by a court. 
On or about February 14, 2003, the court entered an ex-parte protective order against 
respondent with only one provision. That provision was contained in paragraph 1, as follows: 
"The Respondent is restrained from attempting, committing, or threatening to commit abuse or 
domestic violence against Petitioner." 
The testimony and evidence in the divorce trial covered the same accusations that petitioner 
made in paragraph 6 of her ex-parte petition for protective order. 
However, the court made no finding that respondent had committed domestic violence 
against petitioner either during the parties' marriage or during the pendency of the divorce 
proceedings. The testimony and evidence in the divorce trial did, though, demonstrate 
petitioner's animosity toward respondent in providing parent-time with the parties' minor child. 
At paragraph 26 in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the court states: 
With respect to [petitioner] particularly early in Jaycee's life, the court finds 
indications that [petitioner] made less than adequate effort, and demonstrated 
unwillingness to encourage meaningful contact between Jaycee and 
[respondent]. Also she made less than adequate effort and demonstrated 
unwillingness to help [respondent] develop a meaningful relationship with 
Jaycee. 
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See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, attached as Exhibit "A." 
At paragraph 27 in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the court found: 
The first incident that the court characterizes as [petitioner's] not allowing 
[respondent] to have meaningful contact, nor helping [petitioner] develop a 
meaningful relationship with Jaycee concerns [petitioner's] behavior surrounding 
Jaycee's birth. . . The court finds inexcusable her response to the court order, 
and her response to the court-ordered obligation. 
See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, attached as Exhibit "A." 
At paragraph 26 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the court found: 
If the court had not found a softening of this kind of attitude by the [petitioner], if 
the court believed that [petitioner's] behavior would persist in the future and there 
were no evidence of her softening, that would be large in the court's view and be 
clearly unacceptable. 
See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, attached as Exhibit "A." 
At paragraph 29 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the court found: 
[Respondent] has had the attitude that without a mutually agreed-upon parent-
time schedule, there could be no duty. The court finds this to be erroneous, 
there is an on-going duty to foster contact between parent and child. 
See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, attached as Exhibit "A." 
At paragraph30 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the court found: 
"[Petitioner's] behavior was further inexcusable when she proceeded with the blessing of 
Jaycee without notifying [petitioner]." 
At paragraph 36 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the court found petition 
had a "level of venom" toward respondent and that respondent had grown frustrated." 
At paragraph 32 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, in reference to an 
MMPI administered by Dr. Katherine Kair, the custody evaluator appointed to evaluate the 
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parties in the case, the court found: "[Respondent], during the course of the parties' relationship 
has tended to be controlling and has exhibited some of the traits revealed by an M M P I . . . 
Regarding his parent-time, [respondent] has exhibited some outbursts of anger and acting out 
on some occasions. However, the court does not find that any of those instances, particularly 
anything recent, was controlling behavior because of the recent vintage of behavior arose out of 
[respondent's] frustration of his meaningful contact with his child." 
On or about February 19, 2003, the petition for protective order came on for an 
evidentiary hearing before the Honorable Kay L. Mclff, the same judge who heard the parties' 
divorce case. The testimony showed that the alleged incidence of domestic violence occurred 
surrounding a parent-time exchange. Tr. 2/19/03, p. 7. The trial court was familiar with the 
parties and with the history of parent-time difficulties. The court had presided over the divorce 
trial only six months before. At the protective order trial,. The court referred to its findings of 
fact from the divorce trial. Tr. 2/19/03, p. 24. 
Regarding the alleged domestic violence incident, the evidence showed that before the 
incident took place, the parties had argued on the telephone concerning a medical issue 
concerning the child. Tr. 2/19/03, p. 8. Furthermore, the parties disagreed over parent-time. 
The testimony showed that earlier in the day, petitioner had called the police and had reported 
that respondent had failed to bring the child back. She wanted to know if the police could do 
anything. Tr. 2/19/03, pp. 10-11. However, respondent testified that the parent-time that he 
had exercised was within the parent-time contemplated by the parties' Decree of Divorce. Tr. 
2/19/03, p. 17. 
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At the time of the incident, petitioner testified that she was home alone with her children 
who were all in another room and when respondent came to the door. Petitioner testified that 
respondent was talking about taking the child to the doctor and tried to hand petitioner a card. 
Petitioner didn't want to take the card. She sat the child down and as she stood back up, the 
respondent grabbed her head and slammed it into a piece of furniture near the door. Tr. 
2/19/03, pp. 7-8. Petitioner testified that she had received a cut on her head as a result that 
resulted from respondent slamming her head into the furniture Tr. 2/19/03, p. 9. 
Respondent testified the visitation involved his taking the child for two days of parent-
time pursuant to the decree of divorce. Tr. 2/19/03, p. 14. Respondent testified that petitioner 
told him that if he ever took the child for two days in a row, she would have him arrested. Tr. 
2/19/03, p. 14. Respondent testified that when he walked through the door to give petitioner 
the child, the petitioner had a hat pulled down over her eyes and her head was down. Tr. 
2/19/03, p. 15. Respondent testified he handed petitioner the child and a business card and 
she said nothing to him. Petitioner took the child and respondent left immediately. Respondent 
was in a karate class approximately twenty minutes later in a town approximately twenty 
minutes away. Tr. 2/19/03, pp. 19-20. Another witness confirmed that respondent was in a 
karate class approximately twenty minutes after the alleged incident and that respondent's 
demeanor was calm and he was not upset. Tr. 2/19/03, p. 21. 
The court decided to enter a protective order against respondent in petitioner's favor 
stating: 
Well, it sure is apparent to everyone that I have a pretty tough job deciding what 
the truth is with when I have statements like that heard. But I have had enough 
history with these folks to know about the aggravation and the frustration and, 
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ah, I'm satisfied that there has been incidents where frustration has been acted 
upon. You have an obvious injury. Ah, I have diametrically opposed testimony. 
What I'm asked to do is to decide whether or not to enter a protective order. 
That's a - a cautionary device to prevent trouble in the future. I come down on 
that side. I enter a protective order, ah, adjoining restraining the respondent 
from attempting, committing or threatening to abuse or domestic violence 
against the petitioner. Ah, that's the extent to which I'm entering a protective 
order. 
Tr. 2/19/03, p. 26. 
The only provision the court entered in the protective order is paragraph 1, "respondent 
is restrained from attempting, committing, or threatening to commit abuse or domestic violence 
against petitioner." Protective Order, paragraph 1, attached as Exhibit "C." 
The court in admonishing the respondent stated: 
I just want to make it clear that no matter how frustrated, no matter how angry, 
you don't touch, you don't respond out of anger or frustration. You walk away. 
You tell me that's what you did, I'm forced to make a decision. I've made it. 
That's the extent of the - the protective order. 
Tr. 2/19/03, p. 27. 
Respondent brought a motion for a new trial on the grounds that the court did not enter 
findings of fact, but simply entered the protective order on the ground that the protective order 
statute allows for the entry of a protective order only if domestic violence or abuse has 
occurred; and that the court did not find that respondent had committed domestic violence 
against petitioner. The court simply decided to enter a protective order under the legal basis 
that a protective order is "a cautionary device to prevent trouble in the future." In denying the 
petitioner's motion for a new trial, the court said it had heard the competing versions and 
concluded that petitioner's version was credible and that abuse had occurred and there was a 
substantial likelihood that abuse would occur again. If the court failed to articulate that clearly, 
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it was inadvertent and the failure is herein remedied and would serve no useful purpose to 
rehear the competing stories. The motion for a new trial is denied and the protective order 
remains in force. Order Denying Motion for New Trial, Exhibit "D." 
Respondent brought this appeal. See Notice of Appeal, attached as Exhibit "E." 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court entered a protective order against respondent without making adequate 
findings or having sufficient evidence before it that domestic violence had occurred. 
The parties had a history of disputes over parent-time, of which the trial court was 
familiar. The trial court had tried the parties' divorce case over six months before trying the 
protective order case. 
Also, the petitioner had accused respondent of abuse in the past, but none of the 
accusations had resulted in the entry of protective orders, criminal convictions, or findings of 
abuse. 
The testimony of concerning the alleged incident of domestic violence was, essentially, 
a he-said/she-said account with no witnesses present. The court, in entering a protective order, 
did not make specific findings of fact, nor even specifically find domestic violence had, in fact, 
occurred. Instead, the court entered an order restraining respondent from abusing petitioner 
and implied that it entered the order as a prophylactic measure. The court entered conclusory 
findings only after respondent moved the court for a new trial. The Court of Appeals should 
grant respondent's appeal and vacate the protective order because it's entry was clearly 
erroneous. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND FAILED TO 
MAKE SUFFICIENT FACTUAL FINDINGS IN ENTERING A PROTECTIVE 
ORDER AGAINST RESPONDENT. 
The trial court's entry of a protective order was based upon its finding that "petitioner's 
version [of the events of February 13, 2003] was credible and that abuse had occurred and that 
there was a substantial likelihood that abuse would occur again." Order Denying Motion for 
New Trial, attached as Exhibit "D." A court's finding of fact is reviewed under a clearly 
erroneous standard of review. Young v. Young, 1999 UT 38, 15. When challenging a trial 
court's findings, "an appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then 
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to 
be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'" Jd. (citing in 
re: Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989)). Regarding the protective order, whether 
the trial court's decision to grant a petition for domestic violence protective order will be upheld 
if it is supported by either the trial court's specific findings or the undisputed evidence. See 
Bailey v. Bavles. 2001 Ut. App. 34, 10. 
Petitioner, in filing for a protective order, sought assistance from the trial court under 
Chapter 6, Title 30, the Cohabitant Abuse Act, §§30-6-1 to 14 Utah Code Ann. §30-6-4.2(1 )(b) 
Utah Code Ann. gives the court authority to enter a protective order against a respondent after 
a hearing upon notice, "if it appears from a petition for an order for protection . . . that domestic 
violence or abuse has occurred." In the instant case, the court entered a protective order in 
favor of petitioner against respondent after an evidentiary hearing. However, the evidence 
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presented at the hearing was not sufficient to sustain a protective order, nor did it apparently 
even convince the judge that domestic violence had occurred. 
In marshaling the evidence, the evidence in favor of the entry of a protective order 
includes that petitioner testified that on February 13, 2003, respondent brought the parties' child 
back from visitation at 8:00 p.m. Tr. 2/19/03, p.7. Respondent was talking about taking the 
child to the doctor and tried to hand petitioner a business card. Petitioner testified that the 
parties had argued earlier in the day about taking the child to a doctor. ]dL Petitioner did not 
want to take the card. She sat the child down and as she stood back up, respondent grabbed 
her head and slammed it into a piece of furniture, jd. Petitioner testified she received a cut on 
her head as a result of respondent's assault. Tr. 2/19/03, p. 9. Petitioner then called 911 Tr. 
2/19/03, p. 9. 
Respondent testified that the parties were having a visitation dispute earlier in the day. 
Tr. 2/19/03, pp. 10-11. Petitioner had called the police on respondent for his failure to bring the 
child back when she thought he should; and she asked the police if there was anything they 
could do about it. Tr. 2/19/03, pp. 10-11. 
Reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's determination 
indicates that the trial court believed respondent abused petitioner. 
Other evidence weighed against the court's decision. The visitation and doctor dispute 
could have convinced the court that petitioner was frustrated with respondent, so accused him 
of domestic violence because, otherwise the police would not assist her. 
Furthermore, although petitioner testified that the children were present in the home 
when the alleged incident occurred, she testified that none of the children were present in the 
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room when respondent came to the door to drop the child off on the visitation exchange. 
Therefore, no one, other than the parties themselves witnessed the exchange. Tr. 2/19/03, pp. 
7-8. Also, respondent testified that petitioner had told him that if he ever took the child for two 
days in a row he would have him arrested; Tr. 2/19/03, p. 14; and the evidence showed that the 
police did nothing when petitioner called them to complain about her claim that respondent had 
violated the visitation order. 
Respondent testified that when he came to the door at 8:00 p.m., petitioner had a hat 
over her eyes and her head was down. Tr. 2/19/03, p. 15. Petitioner could have received the 
cut at another time. Respondent testified that he gave petitioner a business card and left. 
Then he went straight to a karate class approximately twenty minutes away Tr. 2/29/03, pp. 19-
20. Counsel suggested on cross-examination that after petitioner called the police, the police 
came immediately, but there was no evidence to that effect. Respondent's friend who also 
attended the karate class said that she saw respondent at the class at approximately 8:20 p.m. 
and his demeanor was calm and he was not upset Tr. 2/19/03, p.21. 
Although petitioner said that the injury visible on her forehead at the time of trial came 
from respondent's assault, no proof, other than her statement, was presented to the trial court. 
The testimony came down, essentially, to a he-said/she-said argument. Credibility was 
an issue in the protective order trial. It was uncontroverted that no one witnessed the alleged 
assault. The petitioner testified that she received an injury. Respondent said that there was a 
hat pulled down over her eyes, implying that the injury could have been received earlier from 
another event, not from anything he did. The history of the parties, as the court reflected, 
showed a history of "venom of petitioner against respondent and respondent's frustration." 
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However, despite this history, recorded in the findings of fact and recalled by the judge, there 
was no finding that respondent had ever physically abused petitioner in the past. 
The trial court, in making its order, did not reflect particular conviction that respondent 
had committed domestic violence against petitioner or that the assault actually took place. The 
trial court did not make any specific finding that domestic violence had taken place, or that there 
was a substantial likelihood that petitioner would suffer from abuse in the future. Despite the 
urging by petitioner's counsel that respondent be prohibited from going to the petitioner's home 
for parent-time exchanges, the court declined to make any modifications of the divorce decree 
pertaining to parent-time and did not restrict respondent's access in the protective order, Tr. 
2/19/03, pp. 25-26. Nor did the trial court enjoin respondent in any way from contacting the 
petitioner. The only provision of the protective order that the court entered against respondent 
was that the court restrained respondent from "attempting, committing or threatening to commit 
abuse or domestic violence against petitioner." This is no different than the injunction that 
every member of the public is always under. No member of the public may commit abuse or 
domestic violence against anyone. 
After saying it was a tough job deciding what the truth was and the testimony was 
diametrically opposed, the court continued with, "what I'm asked to do is to decide whether or 
not to enter a protective order." Tr. 2/19/03, p. 26. The court then stated its view that "that's [a 
protective order] a cautionary device to prevent trouble in the future." id. Apparently, the trial 
court believed that a domestic violence protective order is in the nature of a civil restraining 
order in a divorce case. It is but a prophylactic measure designed to prevent trouble rather than 
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an order entered to protect the petitioner against future domestic violence based upon the 
domestic violence petitioner, in fact, already suffered. 
As stated by the appellate court, the purpose of the Cohabitant Abuse Act was to 
"create a timely and simplified process whereby some level of protection and safety could be 
afforded to victims who had previously been outside the umbrella of orders available to persons 
involved in criminal prosecutions. These orders would require that the parties subject to the 
order of protection leave the victim alone and provide some measurable and enforceable 
safeguards, ascertained by the court. Bailey vs. Bavles, 2001 Ut. App. 34, at n.4. 
In the instant case, the court did not, upon conclusion of the evidence, enter findings of 
fact, nor did it enter any specific protection to protect petitioner who supposedly was a victim of 
abuse. Instead, the court simply entered a protective order prohibiting respondent from 
committing domestic violence against petitioner and did not enter any other protective 
provisions. The court further commented that the purpose of the protective order was to 
prevent future problems. Finally, the court warned respondent not to act out his frustrations in a 
violent manner. However, the court recognized that respondent did not, in fact, act out his 
frustrations violently. The court said when it told respondent just to walk away from petitioner 
and problems occurred, "You tell me that is what you did." TR 2/19/03, p. 27. 
Because respondent believed that the court had entered the protective order without 
findings of fact and on an incorrect legal standard-the same standard the court would use in a 
civil restraining order-the respondent filed a motion for a new trial. The court denied the 
motion. The court entered the findings that the court had heard conflicting versions and 
concluded that petitioner's version was credible and that abuse had occurred and that there 
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was a substantial likelihood that abuse would occur again. If the court failed to articulate that 
clearly, it was inadvertent and the failure is herein "remedied." These findings are insufficient to 
support the entry of a protective order against respondent. The findings of the court were 
clearly erroneous and the protective order should be vacated. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court entered a protective order without sufficient evidence and without 
adequate findings apparently as a prophylactic measure to "prevent trouble in the future." This 
is inadequate and clearly erroneous. The protective order should be vacated. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ft day of August, 2003. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C. 
MM 
Attorney far Respondent/Appellant 
16 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on the 26th day of August, 2003,1 caused two 
copies of the foregoing opening brief of appellant to be mailed, postage pre-paid, to: 
DOUGLAS NEELEY 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellee 
100 South Main Street, Suite 205 
Post Office Box 7 
Manti, Utah 84642 
MARY 
Attorne or Respondent/Appellant 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
DOUGLAS L. NEELEY 6290 
Attorney for Respondent 
1st South Main, Suite 205 
P.O. Box 7 
Manti, Utah 84642 
Telephone: (435)835-5055 
Facsimile: (435)835-5057 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH E. FERRERI : FINDINGS OF FACT & 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Petitioner, : 
Civil No. 004600178 
vs. : 
BILLIE RAE FERRERI : JUDGE K.L. McIFF 
Respondent. : 
A trial in the above-entitled matter came on regularly on August 5th and August 8,2002, the 
Honorable K.L. Mclff, District Court Judge, presiding. Petitioner appeared in person and through 
his counsel, Mary Cline, Corporon & Williams, P.C. Respondent appeared in person and through 
her counsel, Douglas L. Neeley. The Court, having reviewed and approved the stipulations of the 
parties, having heard the testimony of witnesses and arguments of counsel, having reviewed the 
documents entered into evidence, and being fully advised in the premises, now hereby enters the 
following: 
r
^Lst£JM&£^_....-,; 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties are husband and wife, having been married on the 19th day of August, 2000. 
The parties separated on November 22, 2000. 
2. The parties are both residents of Sanpete County, State of Utah, and have been for at least 
three months before the commencement of this action. 
3. Irreconcilable differences have arisen between the parties making the continuation of their 
marriage impossible. 
4. There has been one (1) child bom as issue of the marriage, namely, Jaycee Ferreri, whose 
date of birth is June 5, 2001. 
5. The parties stipulate that so long as Petitioner remains employed by Central Utah 
Correctional Facility, he should maintain medical insurance on Jaycee's behalf; and he should pay 
Jaycee's portion of the health insurance premium. 
6. The parties stipulate to dividing equally Jaycee's medical, dental, orthodontic, and 
psychotherapeutic expenses not covered by insurance. 
7. The parties stipulate that Petitioner should pay the cost of Respondent's work-related day 
care not otherwise provided by Petitioner, himself, or by a family member. 
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8 The parties stipulate that the Court should award each of them the real property each 
brought into the marriage and that is titled in their respective names, subject to any encumbrances 
thereon. 
9. The parties stipulate that each should retain the personal property that was in their own 
possession at the time of the trial. 
10. The parties stipulate the Court should award each party his or her own bank and financial 
accounts held in their own names. 
11. The parties stipulate the ( onrt should award each party his or her own retirement or 
pension account that may have accumulated during the parties' marriage. 
12. The parties stipulate the Court should award each party the motor vehicle in his or her 
own possession at the time of the trial, subject to any indebtedness thereon. 
13. The parties stipulate that there are no marital debts. 
14. The parties stipulate that each should assume and pay, and hold the other party harmless 
from, their own respective debts incurred in their own names. 
15. The parties stipulate the Court should award each of them Jaycee's dependency 
exemption, for the purposes of calculating state and federal income taxes, on an alternate, annual 
basis. The Court should award Petitioner Jaycee's dependency exemption in even-numbered tax 
years. The Court should award Respondent Jaycee's dependenc} exemption in odd-number tax 
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years. The Court should order the parties to cooperate fully in providing the necessary tax 
documents for each party to claim Jaycee's dependency exemption in the year in which each has 
been awarded it. 
16. Before the parties married, they resided together as a couple. After the parties began 
living together, and throughout their marriage, the parties commingled their assets, except that 
Respondent received a 530,000 personal injury settlement as her separate property. The parties 
established, with $5,000 from the settlement, a separate account subject to Petitioner's control and 
was utilized on his home which he is awarded. The Court should award Respondent a credit of 
$5,000, or the amount of her separate, pre-marital money that she put into the account used for 
Petitioner's home. 
17. Respondent sold her Centerfield home and the buyer gave Respondent a down-payment. 
Petitioner immediately funneled $2,000 from the down-payment to purchase appliances for 
Petitioner's Manti home. The Court should award Respondent a credit of $2,000 for the appliances. 
18. Respondent purchased a four-wheeler on credit, then transferred the four-wheeler to a 
sibling who promised to make the payments on the four-wheeler debt. However, the sibling did not 
make the payments in a timely fashion, and the delinquency threatened Respondent's credit. 
Petitioner borrowed $2,500, in his own name and used the money to satisfy the four-wheeler debt, 
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in order to protect Respondent's credit. The Court should award Petitiorici a credit in the amount 
of $2,500, ior the amount he borrowed to satisfy the four-wheeler debt. 
19. All the parties' other assets and incomes were commingled during the marriage and used 
for family purposes, and therefore, are not subject to any further credit or debit. 
20. Petitioner is employed at Central Utah Correctional Facility, earning a gross monthly 
income of $2,891. Respondent is employed at $6.65 fvj IIOUJU works 40 hours per week for 4.3 
weeks per month, and produces $1,144 monthly gross income. The parties' combined gross monthly 
income totals $4,035 per month. Petitioner earns 72% of that amount, and Respondent earns 28%. 
Based on these figures, Petitioner should pay Respondent $340 per month as base child support, 
which shall continue until said child reaches the age of eighteen (18) years or graduates from high 
school during the child's normal and expected year of graduation, whichever occurs last. Universal 
Income Withholding does apply pursuant to UCA §62A-11-501 (1953 as amended). All payment: 
should be made through the Office of Recovery Services, P.O. Box 45011, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
84145-0011. This income withholding procedure shall apply to existing and future payors. A child 
support worksheet is attached as Exhibit A. 
21. The parties underwent a custody evaluation; and the custody evaluator testified at trial 
Petitioner paid the up-front cost of the custody evaluation, with the final allocation of the custody 
evaluation to be determined at the time of the trial. It is appropriate and reasonable to apportion the 
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custody evaluation according to the parties' respective contributions to their combined gross monthly 
income. Consequently, the Court should order Petitioner to pay 72% and should order Respondent 
to pay 28% of the cost of the custody evaluation. 
22. Respondent asked the Court to award her her reasonable attorney's fees and costs. The 
Court finds both parties have over-used legal proceedings. The parties grossly overused public 
resources for law enforcement personnel to monitor parent-time exchanges, for pleadings filed, and 
claims advanced; for summoning law officers to appear in Court; and by filing multiple protective 
orders and multiple orders to show cause, and by bringing multiple criminal charges. On the other 
hand, the Court declines to find that all of the proceedings were unnecessary. 
23. Both Petitioner and Respondent requested sole custody of Jaycee. The Court appointed 
Kathryn Kair, Ph.D., to perform a custody evaluation on the parties and the child. Dr. Kair met with 
both parties and prepared a report. She submitted the report to the Court, and it was filed with the 
Court on July 15, 2002. Dr. Kair recommended that the Court award the parties joint legal custody 
and joint physical custody on a 50/50 time-sharing arrangement. The Court finds pluses and minuses 
as to each of the parties as it relates to past conduct involving the child. At first blush, it would 
appear, and the evaluator found, that the Petitioner was more likely to foster that. There are two (2) 
difficulties the Court has with this finding. The onh real track record relates to Respondent. 
Petitioner has never been in a position to where he has been called upon to facilitate and encourage 
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frequent contact. Both parties have come into court and said they are willing to facilitate and 
encourage contact by the other party with the child. The Court does not find a track record with the 
Petitioner in this respect. The Court finds with respect to Respondent some early indications of less 
than adequate, meaningful contact and willingness to foster the development of relationship. 
24. No significant proof changed the moral standards of the parties. 
25. The Court finds from the evidence that there are pluses and minuses as it relates to past 
conduct involving the child. The custody evaluator testified that both parties' parenting skills were 
above average, both parties demonstrated a high i ommitment level and interest in the child, and each 
party demonstrated a capacity to parent the child. The custody evaluator testified that Petitioner was 
more likely than Respondent to allow Jaycee to have frequent and continuing contact with 
Respondent. However, the only actual custodial experience during the time period preceding the 
trial relates to Respondent's behavior regarding frequent and continuing contact with Petitioner. 
Petitioner has never been in a position in which he has been called upon to encourage Jaycee's 
frequent and continuing contact with Respondent. Both parties expressed a willingness in the future 
to allow Jaycee frequent contact with the other party, and to allow the other party's relationship with 
Jaycee to develop. 
26. With respect to Respondent, particularly early in Jaycee's life, the Court finds indications 
that Respondent made less-than-adequate effort, and demonstrated unwillingness to encourage 
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meaningful contact between Jaycee and Petitioner. Also she made less-than-adequate effort an, 
demonstrated an unwillingness to help Petitioner develop a meaningful relationship with Jaycee. 
27. The first incident that the Court characterizes as Respondent's not allowing Petitioner 
to have meaningful contact, nor helping Petitioner develop a meaningful relationship with Jaycee, 
concerns Respondent5 s behavior surrounding Jaycee's birth. By court order, Petitioner was entitled 
to notification and participation in Jaycee's birth. However, Respondent failed to notify Petitioner 
of the birth, and Respondent denied Petitioner participation. The Court finds inexcusable her 
response to the court order, and to her response to her court-ordered obligation. Part of Respondent's 
family found out about the birth of Jaycee on the night of the birth. The rest of Respondent's family 
found out about the birth the next day. However, the Court finds it indefensible on Respondent's 
part that Petitioner found out about the birth through the grapevine, and he was forced to follow up 
with calls to the hospital to verify the information. Respondent's testimony that she asked her 
mother to call Petitioner, or that she expected the doctor to notify Petitioner, was inadequate to 
comply with the Court's order. The Court finds someone could have gotten the message through to 
Petitioner and it was Respondent's responsibility that someone should have done so. 
28. If the Court had not found a softening of this kind of attitude by the Respondent. If the 
Court believed that Respondent's behavior would persist in the future, and there were no evidence 
of her softening, that would loom large in the Court's view and be clearly unacceptable. 
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29. The Court further finds that Respondent has the attitude tha4 w 11 hn ut *i m m ually agreed-
upon parent-time schedule, there can be no duty. The Court finds this view to be erroneous, there 
is an ongoing duty to foster contact between child dnd paierii When the parent-time schedule in 
effect expired at the end of December, 2001, Petitioner prepared a new schedule and sought to 
deliver it to Respoi ident on December 31, 2001. Respondent refused receipt of the schedule. The 
Court does not have conclusive evidence that Respondent, in fact, knew the schedule was identified, 
because Respondent refused to accept any paper from Petitioner. When Petitioner arrived on January 
4, 2002, Respondent refused to answer the dooi btxause no schedule was then in force. However, 
Respondent's refusal to allow any contact further frustrated an adoption of a schedule. 
30. Respondent's behavior was further inexcusable when she proceeded with the blessing 
of Jaycee without notifying Petitioner. Respondent was not entitled to proceed with the child's 
blessing without Petitioner's knowledge. The Court weighs those roadblocks against factors found 
to run the other way. 
31. The Court however, must weigh these roadblocks by the Respondent against factors that 
the Court finds funs the other way. 
32. Petitioner, himself, also created some obstacles to the fostering of Respondent's 
relationship with Jaycee. Petitioner, during the course of the parties' relationship has tended to be 
controlling and has exhibited some of the traits revealed b\ an MMPI administered by Dr. Kathryn 
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Kair. Page three of the report described the results of the test, and the Court finds Petitioner has 
exhibited some of those traits. Regarding his parent-time, Petitioner has exhibited some outbursts 
of anger and acting out on some occasions. However, the Court does not find that any of those 
instances, particularly anything recent, were controlling behavior because of the recent vintage of 
behavior arose out of Petitioner's frustration of his meaningful contact with his child. Nevertheless, 
these events need to be and are weighted by the Court and are not as favorable as the Respondent's 
results for the test and her exhibited behavior. 
33. Respondent's responses to the same MMPI test demonstrate a more even temperament 
and is not inclinated to act out in the same manner as Petitioner. 
34. The Court finds that the relationship of Jaycee to her siblings is important, but it does 
not outweigh the father's relationship with the child, but it is a plus for the Respondent. 
35. The Court finds that it is beneficial to have extended family support, but that support 
should not get in the way of Petitioner's relationship with the child. Respondent has extended family 
support that is beneficial to the child and a plus for the Respondent. If, in the future, Petitioner 
becomes before the Court and demonstrates that Respondent's extended family substantially 
interferes with his parent-time, the Court will not tolerate such behavior. 
36. The Court finds Respondent's level of venom, and Petitioner's frustration, has subsided 
during recent months, and the parties have demonstrated more cooperation. This cooperation is 
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shown by the parties' relaxing the requirement that law enforcement be involved in their parent-time 
exchange1- I a w v n i - > rcement involvement has become a hindrance to the parties-not because of any 
failing on the officers'part. The officers have mini." worl ind-. Monitoring the parties'parent-time 
has become an undue burden for the officers, and the burden does not produce a corresponding 
benefit to the parties. Therefore, the parties themselves have recognized that involvement by the 
police is unnecessary. On the other hand, the evidence of the last few months reveals that the 
parties' willingness to have a more cooperative relationship, but is still not at a level sufficient 
enough for them to work out the joint custody parenting plan as contemplated and required by §30-3-
10.8 Utah Code Ann. The Court finds that the current environment for the 15 month-old child is a 
good environment and it is stable. The Court finds that Respondent has been the custodial parent 
and has provided the primary care setting for Jaycee. The Court iIn that Petitioner sometimes 
works two (2) days in a row, sometimes he works three (3) days in a row, and sometimes he works 
four (4) days in a row. The Court finds that Petitioner sometimes has two (2) days off in a row, 
sometimes he has three (3) days off, and sometimes he has four (4) days off. 
From the foregoing findings of fact, the Court now makes its: 
CONCLUSIONS Ut LAW 
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties and their divorce. 
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2. The parties should be divorced on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, and the decree 
should become final upon entry. 
3. Petitioner should maintain and pay for medical, dental, orthodontic, optometric and 
psychotherapeutic insurance on behalf of the child. Uncovered medical expenses should be divided 
equally between the parties. The decree should include statutory provisions governing notice of 
insurance and requests for reimbursement. 
4. To the extent surrogate care is used, but not provided by either parent or family member, 
Petitioner should pay for such surrogate care necessitated by the parties' work schedule. 
5. Each party should be awarded the real property that each has respectively brought into the 
marriage and is titled in their own name, subject to any indebtedness thereon. 
6. Each party should retain the personal property that was in their own possession at the time 
of the trial. 
7. Each party should be awarded his or her own bank and financial accounts held in his or 
her own respective name. 
8. Each party should be awarded their own retirement or pension accounts that may have 
accumulated during the parties' marriage. 
9. Each party should be awarded the motor vehicle in his or her own possession at the time 
of trial, subject to any indebtedness thereon. 
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10. The parties have no marital debt. 
11. Each party should assume and pay, and hold the other party harmless from, their own 
respective debts, incurred in their own names. 
12. Each party should be entitled to claim Jaycee's dependency exemption for the purpose 
of calculating state and federal income ta;,\ on a alternate, annual basis. Petitioner should be entitled 
to claim Jaycee's dependency exemption in even-numbered tax years R espondent should be entitled 
to claim Jaycee's dependency exemption in odd-numbered tax years. Each party should cooperate 
fully in providing necessary tax documents for each party to claim,, Jaycee's dependency exemption 
in the year in which each has been awarded it. 
13. Petitioner she eimburse Respondent $4,500 as the net result of each parties' 
respective credit and debit of separate funds each contributed during the marriage. 
14. Petitioner should pay Respondent the base child support amount of $340 per month 
according to the Uniform Child Support Guidelines. The decree should include the statutory child 
support provisions. Said support should be paid through the Office of Recovery Services. 
15. Each party should pay the cost of the custody evaluation at the rate of 72% for Petitioner, 
and 28% for Respondent. 
16. Each party should pay his or her own attorney's fees and costs. 
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17. The statute governing child custody is contained at §30-3-10 Utah Code Ann. Section 
30-3-10(l)(a) Utah Code Ann. The statute requires the Court to consider the child's best interest in 
determining custody. Joint legal and joint physical custody cannot be awarded because joint legal 
and joint physical custody are not in Jaycee's best interest. 
18. Utah Code Ann. §30-3-10(a) also requires the Court to consider, in determining custody, 
the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each party. No significant evidence 
challenged the moral standards of either party. In considering the past conduct of the parties, the 
Court concludes both parties have positives and negatives. 
19. Utah Code Ann. §30-3-10(2) requires the Court consider which parent is most likely to 
act in the best interest of the child, including allowing the child frequent and continuing contact witl: 
the noncustodial parent. The Court concludes both parties will allow frequent and continuing contaci 
with the other parent, and each party will act in the best interest of the child. 
20. Recognizing the stability, and the generally good environment provided by Responden: 
in the primary care setting, the Court should award Respondent Jaycee's primary legal and physica 
custody. 
21. Petitioner should have parent-time as allowed by statute, as described for children both 
under five and for five and older, as modified by the Court to conform with Petitioner's work 
schedule. 
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22. Whether Petitioner works the graveyard or day shift, fouiteen hours after Petitioner 
finishes his work block, he may pick up Jaycee and take Jaycee home for visitation for 24 hours. 
After Jaycee turns eighteen •:•.. vhen Petitioner has four days off in a row, 
Petitioner may increase his parent-time to two (2) days (48 hours) at either 8:00 a.m. or 8:00 p.m. 
On days when Petitioner has three days off in a row, Petitioner may have parent-time for one (1) day 
(24) hours. This schedule should continue after Jaycee turns five (5) years old. 
23. The Court should adopt the advisory guidelines contained at §30-3-33 Utah Code Ann. 
The decree should note some guidelines in particular. Attached as Exhibit B is a copy of §30-3-33. 
24. Petitioner should pick up Jaycee at Respondent's home unless she requests alternative 
arrangements. Upon Respondent's giving Petitioner adequate notice that she wants Petitioner to pick 
up Jaycee at a place other than her home, Petitioner should pick Jaycee up at the alternative place 
iii ui return Jaycee to the same place from which he picked Jaycee up. 
25. Petitioner's parent-time should not depend on his payment of child support, nor should 
Respondent be allowed any other excuse for distrupting Petitioner's parent-time. 
26. Petitioner should not interrupt child support payments because of disruptions in parent-
time. 
27. As set forth in §30-3-33(9) Utah Code .Ann., Respondent should notify' Petitioner within 
24 hours of receiving notice of all significant school, social sports and community functions in 
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which Jaycee is participating or being honored-this includes religious events such as blessings-and 
Petitioner should be entitled to attend and participate fully. 
28. Petitioner should have direct access to school records. 
29. Each party must permit and encourage liberal telephone contact. 
30. Parental care is presumed better than surrogate care. When Respondent is working and 
Petitioner is not working, Petitioner may provide care, independent of his court-ordered parent-time. 
The same is true for the Respondent when he needs day care. Respondent may continue to use 
extended family for surrogate care when Petitioner is working or otherwise unavailable, but she may 
not use extended family for surrogate care in preference to care by Petitioner. 
31. The holiday schedule is set forth in §30-3-35 Utah Code Ann. If the holiday awarded 
to Petitioner that year falls on Petitioner's scheduled parent-time day, Petitioner should be entitled 
to that holiday day. If a holiday awarded to Petitioner that year does not fall on Petitioner's 
scheduled parent-time day, the statutory holiday schedule should govern. Because of Petitioner's 
alternating work schedule, the alternating weekends just don't work and the Court has done the best 
it can. In this matter, those provisions just don't work due work. The Petitioner's visitation is the 
best the Court can do given the blocked time off for the Petitioner. 
32. After Jaycee turns five, extended summer parent-time should proceed according to 
statute governing extended parent-time for children five (5) years old and older. 
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33. Until Jaycee is five (5) years old, Petitioner should have as extended summer parent-
time, .i ioi a 1 oi UM • i? \ weeks of summer parent-time. The two (2) weeks should be divided as two 
(2) one-week-long periods separated by four (4) weeks unless the parties otherwise agree. 
34 The Court should direct the parties to make every effort to accommodate reasonable 
modification and changes in ; <. -: \ =.- •. : ue schedule through agreement. There are family trips and 
functions or days that are not identified by the Court, but the parties should cooperate. They need 
not compromise the extent of each parties' contact with Jaycee, but they should facilitate contact, 
either in Petitioner or Respondent's favoi Hit" OUT! shrill. I apply this strict parent-time formula 
because of the parties' demonstrated difficulties in arranging parent-time. 
35. Within 24 hours of receiving hei work schedule, Respondent should notify Petitioner of 
her schedule by telephone or by facsimile. Respondent should not notify Petitioner by ordinary post. 
Respondent should make sure she gets her schedule to Petitioner within 24 hours of her receiving 
the schedule from her employer. 
36. The parent-time schedule should begin Saturday morning, August 10,2002, at 8:00 a.m. 
Petitioner should pick up Jaycee at Respondent's sister, Crystal's, house. 
37. The Respondent's relatives are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court. However, the 
Court should not tolerate any bad-mouthing of the other party, swearing, or the use of expletives 
about the other party. Because Jaycee is part of everyone's life, for the most of the child's life, the 
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parties should find ways to accommodate each other. The parties should act like responsible 
citizens. The parties should refrain from summoning police against each other, calling for security 
against the other party while both parties are in a public place, and other such disniptive and 
antagonistic conduct toward each other. 
38. The surname of the child should be changed to "Ferreri" and a new birth certificate 
should be issued. v 
EXHIBIT "B 
"Ru.> 1 6:il 
Petitioner's Name 
"7^ u^ 7, /Sod* 
Address (may be omitted for privacy) 
City, Stare, ZIP 
Telephone (may be omitted) 
DISTRICT COURT,. 
:;TXU®TV 
., COUNTY, UTAH 
T3.li> 72. fi;ll 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
N,\oScph £- f e r r e t 
Respondent. 
VERIFIED PETITION FOR 
PROTECTIVE ORDER 
C a s e N o . _ 0 3 % 0 ^ y P 
Assigned Judge ^^miUA^ 
PETITIONER IS ADVISED THAT LYING TO OBTAIN A PROTECTIVE ORDER MAY BE 
CONSIDERED A FELONY UNDER THE UTAH CODE. 
The Petitioner alleges against the Respondent and states as follows: 
1. Either Petitioner or Respondent resides, or the acts occxirred, in this County. 
2. Neither party is the minor child (step, adoptive, or natural) of the other party 
3. Petitioner is 16 or older, or emancipated. Petitioner and Respondent have the following 
relationship (check and circle all that apply): 
arnsd; [divorced on: \ q c \ 9*0-
 ) O ^ ] 
• [airremly living/have lived] as if mairied; 
8/2000 
• 
D 
4. 
related by blood or marriage, [describe relationship. £ y - p ^ ^ A n ^ 
have one or more children together; 
have an unborn child together; 
[currently residmg/have resided] rn the same residence. 
Petitioner and Respondent are the parents of the following minor children: 
NAME BIRTH DATE ADDRESS 
Florence, \a\>o-cz ferreri U-S-C3 1$ U). \oo l) Gf.f£crC:di 
These minor children have resided at the following location^) for the past year (give the locations 
and the dates at each location): 
5. On or about rk" ^ u , 20 <03 the Respondent threatened, attempted, or 
caused the following acts of abuse or domesnc violence. (Describe m detail what happened, where, who 
was involved (including the minor children and family and household members), if weapons were involved, 
and if injuries resulted Attach Continuation Sheets if necessary) 
Oc?c C-&rr\z_. Vo t>v^  ^Qrr\f_ ax ffpr^ \>* dkqfte f-^24 <Le,-^ 
n i £ X 4-oft yc ToLv^rr £ T V , ^ K. r>^
 t he u.>cx^  S ^ . 
8'20O0 
4 U e . W i n X <•>>£ rr»v| V H V I A rtLf\A <Sla<vut<-\eA \ \ AoLJn. n n rrW 
VPOLU 4re.<L \ M ^ W . Anor. Ujp -t^rg.Lt^ "Hie. OrxrJ a4 m e 
^ioA ^4ur^5> . . 
6. The following is a description of other acts of abuse or domestic violence by Respondent 
(Describe -with the same detail as above. Attach Continuation Sheets if necessary.) 
yU. WAS W a i rv^jW^s. V-.UfcA <wk<, V,*^ K s 
C;c«A u > . P f . . U r , V i^s W x d CX p\>^;fAP^f>- ^ r n C : \ 
( W e uVK:cJh SVQW.S \p< Vvas V.^icrH ca4bur<}s^ 
VW L s W;<L.A \n K r e . "^<Lnp\e. Vr. V > A 4 m e aft 
S/2000 
7. Check one; 
D no cases of any type involving Petitioner, Respondent and/or the others named in ibis petition 
have been filed in any court. 
Kihe following cases which involve Petitioner, Respondent and/orthe others named in this petition 
have been filed in any court at any time: 
Court or County where Type of Case (e.g. divorce, protective 
case filed order) Anil Case number (if known) 
Has a judge signed an 
order? 
5 a . f M ^ r ^ ^ 
| \ v ?' 
! t>;vjorrj*. 
i &rf^A:\/d orA-e/r 
!
 StS 
1
 ^c<S 1 
8. The following other cases have involved or currently involve Petitioner, Respondent and/or 
the others named in this petition: 
9. I also request relief for the following iamtty and household members: 
CXTN 
WHEREFORE: I respectfully request thai this Court 
1. Order the Respondent to appear at a hearing, 
2. Immediately issue an Ex-Parte Protective Order and, after the hearing, issue a Protective 
Order containing the following relief (Check boxes of relief that you are requesting): 
J& Restrain the Respondent from attempting, threatening or committing abuse or domestic 
violence against Petitioner. 
8/2000 
)( Restrain the Respondent from attempting, threatening or committing abuse or domestic 
violence against the minor children and the designated fenrily and household members. 
V Prohibit the Respondent from directly or indirectly contacting, harassing, telephoning, or 
otherwise communicating with the Petitioner. 
D Order the Respondent to vacate and stay away from the residence located at: 
__ „ , and any 
subsequent residence of Petitioner, and prohibit the Respondent from terminating or interfering 
with die utility services to the residence. 
V Order the Respondent to stay ara^ from Petition^ and 
other places frequented by Petitioner, the minor children and designated family or household 
members. These places are identified by the following address(es): 
D Prohibit the Respondent from purchasing, using, or possessing a firearm or other weapon 
as designated by the court, including: 
D Award possession of the following residence, automobile and/or other essential personal 
effects: 
Order a law enforcement officer to accompany Petitioner to the residence to ensure that 
S>'2000 
Petitioner is safely restored to possession of the listed items. 
o Order a law enforcement officer to supervise Respondent*s removal of essential personal 
belongings from the residence. 
D Order Respondent to participate in an electronic monitoring program. 
& Order the Department of Child and Family Services to conduct an investigation into the 
possibilities of child abuse. 
tf Appoint a Guardian ad Litem to represent fee best interests of the children, 
3, Include in the Protective Order the following temporary relief which should be: in effect for 
up to 150 days (explain in writing and attach if additional time will be necessary). 
y/ Giant Petitioner custody of the minor chfld/ien. 
i f Order the following visitation anangement (if requesting visitation arranged through, or 
supervise&by, another person, state the name and phone number of thai person): \ 
• Restrain Respondent from using drugs and/or alcohol prior to or during visitation 
Itf Restrain Respondent from removing the minor child/ren from the state. 
D Order Respondent to pay child support m the amount of $ pursuant to 
the Utah Uniform Child Support Guidelines. 
X^ Order Respondent to participate in mandatory income withholding pursuant to Utah Code 
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Annotated § 62A-11, Parts 4 and 5. 
D Order Respondent to pay one-half of the minor child/ren's day care expenses. 
D Order Respondent to pay one-half of the minor child/reris medical expenses including 
premiums, deductibles and co-payments. 
• Order Respondent to pay spousal support in the amount of $ „ . 
D Order Respondent to pay Petitioner's medical expenses suffered as a result of abuse in the 
amount of $ , 
D Order Respondent to pay the minor children's medical expenses suffered as a result of 
abuse in the amount of $ . 
O Order any other relief that the court considers necessary for fee safety and welfare of 
Petitioner, the children and designated household and family members, including: 
DATED: 2~ \A- D^ 
8/2000 
State of Utah ) 
( ss: 
County ) 
Being swam, I state that I am the Petitioner; that I have read this Petition and the statements in it 
are true and correct to the best of my knowledge; that I believe I am entitled to the relief requested, and 
that this Petition is not being used to harass or to abuse process. 
Petitioner 
Subscribed and sworn to befote.uxe on. 
T^na?ldsfry\. 
Serve Respondent at: \ 
$*&' ;' Clerk or Notary Public 
.Residing at 
My Commission Expires: 
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EXHIBIT "C 
Petitioner's Name 
Address (may be omitted for privacy) 
Qty, State, ZIP 
Telephone (may be omitted) 
DISTRICT COURT,. 
503 "EB 20 fiH S 52 
BY, •x?urr.. 
.COUNTY, UTAH 
"vkxV..^  Q., &:l\ 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
Respondent 
PROTECTIVE ORDER 
Case No. CrhflpO&QctQ 
Assigned Judge: 
This matter came forbearing on ^f.l t j \C> ^before the imdetsigned- The following 
parties were in attendance: / 
y(^ Petitioner ^/ Petitioner's attorney 
)£^mm Respondent Jff Respondent's attorney m 
The Comr having reviewed Petitioner's Verified Petition for Protective Order and: 
/Chaving received argument and evidence, 
. having accepted the stipulation of the parties 
having entered the default of the Respondent for Mure to appear 
and it appearing that domestic violence or abuse has occurred, 
t&M 
TT IS HEREBY ORDERED PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE SECTION 30-64.2: 
(The Judge or Commissioner shall initial 
each section that is included in this Order.) 
1. The Rcspondeni is restrained ficom attempting, commitiing, orthreatcning to commit abuse 
or domestic violence against Petitioner. 
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2. The Respondent is restrained from attempting, committing, or threatening to commit abuse 
or domestic violence against the following minor children and members of Petitioner's family or 
household: 
3. The Respondent is prohibited from directly or indirectly contacting, harassing, telephoning, 
or otherwise communicating with the Petitioner. 
4. The Respondent shall be removed and excluded, and shall stay away, from Petitioner's 
residence, and its premises, located at: 
and any subsequent residence of Petitioner, and Respondent is prohibited from terminating or 
interfering with the utility services to the residence. 
5. The Respondent is ordered to stay away from the school, place of employment, and/or 
other places, and their premises, frequented by Petitioner, the minor children and the designated 
household and family members. These places are identified by the following addresses: 
6. The Court having found that Respondent's use or possession of a weapon may pose a 
serious threat of harm to Petitioner, the Respondent is prohibited from purchasing, using, or 
possessing a firearm and/or the following weapon(s): 
7. The Petitioner is awarded possession of the following residence, automobile and/or other 
essential personal effects: 
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This award is subject to orders concerning the listed property in future domestic proceedings. 
8. An officer from the following law enforcement agency: 
shall accompany Petitioner to ensure that Petitioner safely 
regains possession of the awarded property. 
9. An officer from the same law enforcement agency shall facilitate Respondent's removal of 
Respondent's essential personal belongings from the parties' residence. The law enforcement 
officer shall contact Petitioner to make these arrangements. Respondent may not contact the 
Petitioner or enter the residence to obtain any items. 
10. The Respondent is placed under the supervision of the Department of Corrections for the 
purposes of electronic monitoring. Within 24 hours of the execution of this Order, the Department 
of Corrections shall place an electronic monitoring device on Respondent and shall install 
monitoring equipment on the premises of Petitioner and in the residence of Respondent. 
Respondent is ordered to pay to the Department of Corrections the costs of the electronic 
monitoring required by this Order. The Department of Corrections shall have access to Petitioner's 
residence to install the appropriate monitoring equipment. 
RESPONDENT'S VIOLATION OF PROVISIONS " 1 " THROUGH "10" OF THIS ORDER 
IS A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR UNDER UTAH CODE SECTION 76-5-108. 
IFRESPONDENT'S VIOLATION OFPROVISIONS " 1 " THROUGH "10" OF THIS ORDER 
IS A SECOND OR SUBSEQUENT DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OFFENSE, ENHANCED 
PENALTIES MAY BE IMPOSED UNDER UTAH CODE SECTIONS 77-36-1.1 AND 77-36-2.4. 
Petitioner is granted the following temporary relief (provisions "a" through "1") which will 
(expire/be reviewed by the court) days from the date of this order: 
a. The Petitioner is granted custody of the following minor children: 
b. Visitation shall be as follows: 
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c. The Respondent is restrained from using drugs and/or alcohol prior to or during visitation. 
d. The Respondent is restrained from removing the parties' minor child/ren from the state of 
Utah. 
e. The Respondent is ordered to pay child support to the Petitioner in the amoimt of $ 
pursuant to the Utah Uniform Child Support Guidelines. 
f The Respondent is ordered to participate in mandatory income withholding pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated § 62A-11, Parts 4 and 5. 
g. The Respondent is ordered to pay one-half of the minor child/ren's day care expenses. 
h. The Respondent is ordered to pay one-half of the minor child/ren's medical expenses 
including premiums, deductibles and co-payments. 
L The Respondent is ordered to pay Petitioner spousal support in the amount of 
$ . 
j . The Respondent is ordered to pay Petitioner's medical expenses, suffered as a result of the 
abuse in the amount of $ . 
k. The Respondent is ordered to pay the minor child/ren's medical expenses, suffered as a 
result of the abuse in the amount of S . 
1 Other: 
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Violation of provisions "a" through "I" may subject Respondent to contempt proceedings. 
11. The Division of Child and Family Services is ordered to conduct an investigation into the 
allegation of child abuse. 
12. Other: 
13. Law enforcement agencies withjxmsdictionoverthepTOtectedlocationsshaUhave authority 
to compel Respondent's compliance with this Order, including the authority to forcibly evict and restrain 
Respondent from the protected areas. Information to assist with identification of the Respondent is 
attached to the Appendix to this Order. 
14. Respondent was afforded both notice and opportunity to be heard in the hearing that gave 
rise to this order. Pursuant to the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, PL. 103-322,108 Stat 1976, 
18 U.S.C.A. 2265, this order is valid in all the United States, the District of Columbia, tribal lands, and 
United States Territories. 
15. Three years after the date of this order, a hearing may be held to dismiss the remaining 
provisions of the order. Within 30 days prior to the end of the three-year period, the Petitioner should 
provide the court with a current address, which address will not be made available to Respondent. 
THE PETITIONER CANNOT WAIVE, ALTER OR DISMISS THIS ORDER WITHOUT 
FURTHER COURT ACTION. EITHER PARTY MAY BE HELD IN CONTEMPT FOR 
IGNORING OR ALTERING THE TERMS OF THIS ORDER. 
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DATED 
BY THE COURT. 
Recommended by. 
Distnct Court Commissioner Date 
By thisjigijature, Respondent approves the form, and accepts sara/ice/ 
personally served. % iCtive Order anH waives thff ngV 
Serve Respondent at: 
£ir^-~^m*~rrm °^,'r>rT^c^wv-tITAH 
C3L' , 
i 
C~ I ' 
, C&teoIUtoh, 
i ye sad coned 
rnycStoB. 
.20. 
li^^RfcSHKKcCHT COUWTYCL2RK 
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EXHIBIT "D" 
DISTRICT COURT, SANPETE COUNTY,sUTAH 
160 North Main Street 
Manti, UT 84642 
Telephone- 435-835-2131 Fax 435-835-2135 
BillieRGill, 
vs. 
Joseph E Ferreri, 
———— --
Respondent. 
Order denying motion for new trial 
Case No. 034600040 
Assigned Judge. K L Mclff 
Respondent moves the Court for anew trial based upon the Court's failure to make a specific 
finding of abuse. 
The Court heard the competing versions and concluded that petitioner's version was credible 
and that abuse had occurred and that there was a substantial likelihood that abuse would occur again. 
If the Court failed to articulate that clearly, it was inadvertent and the failure is herein remedied. It 
would serve no useful purpose to rehear the competing stories. 
The motion for a new trial is denied and the protective order remains in force 
Order denvine motion for new trial Case number 034600040. Page -2-
CEPvTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On April \ 1 , 2003 a copy of the above Order denying motion for new trial was sent to 
each of the following by the method indicated: 
Addressee Method (M^mail, P^ Tn person, F=Fax) Addressee 
Douglas L Neeley 
Attorney at Law 
1st South Main, Suite 205 
P O Box 7 
Manti, Utah 84642 
[ P ] Mary Cline 
Attorney at Law 
808 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Method (M^mail, P 8 ^ person, F-Fax) 
[ M ] 
.VlfcirV 
EXHIBIT "E" 
FILFD 
Mary Cline #5932 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C 
Attorney for Respondent 
808 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: 328-1162 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
JN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SANPcTE COUNTY. UTAH 
2003 nay 13 RFI 1 1 1 5 
K o 1 r ~ ' c '" •"' 1 c •** 1 • •• .*« :j T-
SANPETE COUNTY CLERK 
BY .TVU^S^w DEPUTY 
BOJER.GJLL, 
Petitioner, 
v, 
JOSEPH B.FERRERI, 
Respondent. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 034600040 
Judge K.L McIU 
Pursuant to Rule 3 Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, respondent, Joseph E. Ferrcri, by 
and through counsel, Mary Cline, Coiporon & Williams, P.C, appeals to the Court of Appeals 
from the protective order entered by the Sixth Judicial District Court, Sanpete County, the 
Honorable K. L. Mclff, presiding, on February 19,2003. Respondent's motion for a new trial 
pursuant to R59 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was denied. The order denying the motion was 
entered April 17,2003. 
Dated this f^dzy of. 
_, 2003. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On this, 
of the foregoing, Notice of Appeal, to be mailed, First Class postage pre-paid, to: 
li  f^dayof lOilcJ _ , 2003,1 hereby certify that I caused a correct copy 
DOUGLAS L. NEELEY 
"Attorney at Law 
Counsel for petitioner, Billie R. Gill 
1" South Main, Suite 205 
PO Box 7 
Manti, Utah 84642 
2 
